As of summer 2024, I have been an Associate Professor at Waseda Institute for Advanced Study (早稲田大学高等研究所), a research fellow of WATANABE Lab, and a member of Waseda Philosophy Research Group (WPRG). Also from 2024, I have been an Associate Editor of Cognitive Science: A Multidisciplinary Journal.
I am a philosopher by training, but I also hold a MSc degree of Psychology and Neuroscience of Mental Health from Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology, and Neuroscience at King's College London.
Back home in Taiwan, I am a philosopher-in-residence of NTU Brain and Consciousness Lab, Brain and Cognition Lab, and co-founded Taiwan Intercollegiate Consciousness Society and Taiwan Consciousness Research Association.
My first job was at NCCU Department of Philosophy, Taiwan (2019-2024). I was also affiliated with Research Center of Mind, Brain and Learning, Artificial Intelligence Interdisciplinary Center, and directing Center for Phenomenology, at the same school. It is also my Alma mater.
Before working full-time, in 2019 I visited 1) Institut Jean Nicod, École Normale Supérieure, 2) Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, and 3) Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, London. These visitings are partially funded by Royal Institute of Philosophy. I also often visited U.C. Berkeley's Department of Philosophy. I was also a steering committee member of iCog (2016-2022), and was an associate editor of The Brains Blog recently (2022-2024).
Earlier, I was a SSNaP fellow at Duke Institute for Brain Sciences (2017-8), a philosopher-in-residence of UCL Action and Body Lab at Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience (2015-9), a recognised student at Department of Philosophy, University of Oxford (2018), and a PhD student at UCL Department of Philosophy (2015-8).
I primarily work on the subjective, the objective, and the relation between them. My entry points are the senses and consciousness, as they mediate varieties of minds and the world. Other considerations include imagination, memory, and dream. The general framework is Oxford Kantianism, initiated by P. F. Strawson and Gareth Evans, and was later taken up by John McDowell, Quassim Cassam, Naomi Eilan, and Anil Gomes, amongst others. What's distinctive about my approach is that I incorporate resources from phenomenology and cognitive sciences into this Kantian framework. Another way to describe my research is that I attempt to understand how transcendental, phenomenological, and empirical psychology can mesh with one another.
Sample Publications (Some descriptions in MY WORK)
Transcendental Argument in the 21st Century: Problems, Prospects, and Progresses (first editor, with J. Leech and A. Bardon, in preparation), Bloomsbury Academic
Philosophy of Science (editor, in preparation), Rebus
Conundrums of Consciousness: In Search of Several Non-fundamental Theories (in preparation), Routledge
"Constructing the Tactile Field: Somatosensory Gearing for Spatial Structures" (with Patrick Haggard et al., in preparation)
"Neither Object Nor Content: Situating Gupta's Reformed Empiricism" (in preparation). In: Rosenhagen, R. (ed.) Reformed Empiricism and Its Prospects.
"Book Symposium for Transcendental Epistemology" (expected 2025), Asian Journal of Philosophy
Philosophy of Perception (expected 2025), Palgrave Macmillan
"On the Transcendental Explanation of Intentionality" (2025), Australasian Philosophical Review
"How to be Pluralistic about Neural Correlates of Consciousness" (2025), WIAS Bulletin
"What Makes a Theory of Consciousness Unscientific?" (second corresponding author, with IIT-concerned et al., 2025), Nature Neuroscience
Response 1; Response 2
IIT Controversy FAQ; The Original Letter
"Capturing the Elusive Self: Review of Know Thyself: The New Science of Self-Awareness" (2025), Philosophical Psychology 38
"Artificial Intelligence in Lie Detection: Why Do Cognitive Theories Matter?" (with Philip Tseng, 2025), New Ideas in Psychology 76
"The Sustenance and Retention of Perspectival Shape Representations" (with Philip Tseng et al., 2024), Consciousness and Cognition 126
"Structural Correspondence in Molyneux's Subjects" (2024), Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5
Consciousness and Its Epistemic Roles (special issue, first editor, with Takuya Niikawa, 2024), Synthese
"Book Symposium for John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity" (2024), Asian Journal of Philosophy
"Book Review: Philosophy of Neuroscience" (2024), Erkenntnis
"Neural Representations of Perspectival Shapes and Attentional Effects: Evidence from fMRI and MEG" (with Yi Lin et al., 2024), Cortex 176
"Causal Prominence for Neuroscience" (with Philip Tseng, 2024), Nature Reviews Neuroscience 25
"Schellenberg and the Capacity to Perceive" (2024). In: Vuletić, M. and Beck, O. (eds.) Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience. Springer
Transcendental Epistemology (2024), Cambridge University Press.
"Perspectival Shapes are Viewpoint-Dependent Relational Properties" (first author, with Yi Lin and Cheng-Wei Wu, 2024), Psychological Review 131(1)
"The Language of Tactile Thoughts" (2023), Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46
"Predictive Processing in the Second Brain: From Gut Complex to Meta-Awareness" (first author, with Su-Ling Yeh et al., 2023). In: Cheng, T., Sato, R., and Hohwy, J. (eds.) Expected Experiences: The Predictive Mind and in Uncertain World. Routledge
Expected Experiences: The Predictive Mind in an Uncertain World (first editor, with R. Sato and J. Hohwy, 2023), Routledge
"Transcendental Arguments" (with Robert Stern, 2023). In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
"Artificial Agential Intelligence" (2022), Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 9(3)
"Illusions, Objectivity, and Non-Reductive Emergentism: Reply to Rose" (2022), Perception 51(12)
"Taking Conceptual Issues Really Seriously: One Next Step for the Cognitive Science of Consciousness" (first author, with Yi Lin and Philip Tseng, 2022), Cognitive Science: A Multidisciplinary Journal 46
"Demystifying Consciousness and Non-cognitive Theories of Consciousness" (2022), Journal of Neurophilosophy 1(2)
"Bodily Awareness" (2022). In The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
"Book Review: In Consciousness We Trust" (with Yi Lin, 2022), Perception 51(8)
"Book Review: Metazoa - Animal Life and the Birth of the Mind" (2022), Biosystems 219
"Spatial Representations in Sensory Modalities" (2022), Mind and Language 37(3)
"P3b does not Reflect Perceived Contrasts" (with Brown Hsieh et al., 2022), eNeuro 9(2)
"Post-Perceptual Confidence and Supervaluative Matching Profile" (2022), Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65(3)
"Radical Internalism Meets Radical Externalism, Or: Smithies' Epistemology Transcendentalised" (2022), Asian Journal of Philosophy 1(1)
"Touch and other Somatosensory Senses" (first author, with Antonio Cataldo, 2022). In: De Brigard, F. and Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (eds.) Neuroscience and Philosophy. MIT Press
"Book Review: The Epistemic Role of Consciousness" (2022), Philosophical Quarterly 72(1)
"Perception" (2022). In: Young, B. and Dicey Jennings, C. (eds.) Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience. Routledge
John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity: Oxford Kantianism Meets Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences (2021), Bloomsbury Academic
[Scholarly Monograph Award in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Academia Sinica, 2022]
Self and World, 20 Years On (special issue, editor, 2021), Analytic Philosophy 62(1)
"Molyneux's Question and Somatosensory Spaces" (2020). In: Ferretti, G. and Glenney, B. (eds.) Molyneux's Question and the History of Philosophy. Routledge
Objectivity, Space, and Mind (special issue, first editor, with P. F. Snowdon, 2019), Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences 18(5)
Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science (first editor, with O. Deroy and C. Spence, 2019), Routledge
"Quine’s Naturalism and Behaviorisms" (2018), Metaphilosophy 49(4)
"A Mechanism for Spatial Perception on Human Skin" (with F. Fardo, B. Beck, and P. Haggard, 2018), Cognition 178
"The Recurrent Model of Bodily Spatial Phenomenology" (first author, with P. Haggard, 2018), Journal of Consciousness Studies 25(3-4)
"Spatial Perception and the Sense of Touch" (with P. Haggard, B. Beck, and F. Fardo, 2017). In: de Vignemont, F. and Alsmith, A. (eds.) The Subject's Matter: Self-Consciousness and the Body. MIT Press
"The Sceptical Paradox and the Nature of the Self" (2016), Philosophical Investigations 39(1)
"The Trajectory of Self" (with T. Lane, N. Duncan, and G. Northoff, 2016), Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20(7)
"Book Review: Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness" (2016), Philosophical Psychology 29(4)
"Why Animals are Persons" (2016), Animal Sentience 1(10)
“Obstacles to Testing Molyneux’s Question Empirically" (2015), i-Perception 6(4)
"Book Review: The First Sense" (2015), Frontiers in Psychology 6
Online Talks
Causation in Neuroscience (2025, Jan. 11th)
理論心理學（下） (2023, Jan. 15th)
理論心理學（上） (2022, Dec. 4th)
康德與現象學 (課堂2022, Sep. 29th)
化學感官 (2022, June 29th)
莫利紐茲問題：思想實驗與科學實驗 (2022, June 1st)
觸覺與身體感 (2022, June 1st)
時間與時間意識 (2022, April 16th)
McDowellian Naturalism and Strong Emergence (2022, March 9th)
意識的真象與假象 (2021, Dec. 1st)
Transcendental Arguments, Conceivability, and De Re Necessity (2021, Nov. 8th)
(Un)consciousness and (In)attention (2021, Oct. 28th)
On The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2021, May 1st)
Blogposts etc.
布倫塔諾的哲學心理學 (2024)
Philosophy of Touch in the Laboratory (2022)
申請英國哲學研究所分享 (2022)
麥克道爾 (2022)
Précis of John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity (2021)
知覺哲學：傳統與跨域 (2021)
麥克道爾論世界中的主體性 (2021)
哲學與認知科學：我的個人體驗 (2021)
注意力與意識 (2020)
安斯康姆式的行動以及自我知識理論 (2020)
哲學要訣？ [多位作者] (2020)
當代英美哲學的差異 (2019)
意識哲學的五本好書 (2019)
其他作者的作品
I am a philosopher by training, but I also hold a MSc degree of Psychology and Neuroscience of Mental Health from Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology, and Neuroscience at King's College London.
Back home in Taiwan, I am a philosopher-in-residence of NTU Brain and Consciousness Lab, Brain and Cognition Lab, and co-founded Taiwan Intercollegiate Consciousness Society and Taiwan Consciousness Research Association.
My first job was at NCCU Department of Philosophy, Taiwan (2019-2024). I was also affiliated with Research Center of Mind, Brain and Learning, Artificial Intelligence Interdisciplinary Center, and directing Center for Phenomenology, at the same school. It is also my Alma mater.
Before working full-time, in 2019 I visited 1) Institut Jean Nicod, École Normale Supérieure, 2) Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, and 3) Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, London. These visitings are partially funded by Royal Institute of Philosophy. I also often visited U.C. Berkeley's Department of Philosophy. I was also a steering committee member of iCog (2016-2022), and was an associate editor of The Brains Blog recently (2022-2024).
Earlier, I was a SSNaP fellow at Duke Institute for Brain Sciences (2017-8), a philosopher-in-residence of UCL Action and Body Lab at Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience (2015-9), a recognised student at Department of Philosophy, University of Oxford (2018), and a PhD student at UCL Department of Philosophy (2015-8).
I primarily work on the subjective, the objective, and the relation between them. My entry points are the senses and consciousness, as they mediate varieties of minds and the world. Other considerations include imagination, memory, and dream. The general framework is Oxford Kantianism, initiated by P. F. Strawson and Gareth Evans, and was later taken up by John McDowell, Quassim Cassam, Naomi Eilan, and Anil Gomes, amongst others. What's distinctive about my approach is that I incorporate resources from phenomenology and cognitive sciences into this Kantian framework. Another way to describe my research is that I attempt to understand how transcendental, phenomenological, and empirical psychology can mesh with one another.
Sample Publications (Some descriptions in MY WORK)
Transcendental Argument in the 21st Century: Problems, Prospects, and Progresses (first editor, with J. Leech and A. Bardon, in preparation), Bloomsbury Academic
Philosophy of Science (editor, in preparation), Rebus
Conundrums of Consciousness: In Search of Several Non-fundamental Theories (in preparation), Routledge
"Constructing the Tactile Field: Somatosensory Gearing for Spatial Structures" (with Patrick Haggard et al., in preparation)
"Neither Object Nor Content: Situating Gupta's Reformed Empiricism" (in preparation). In: Rosenhagen, R. (ed.) Reformed Empiricism and Its Prospects.
"Book Symposium for Transcendental Epistemology" (expected 2025), Asian Journal of Philosophy
Philosophy of Perception (expected 2025), Palgrave Macmillan
"On the Transcendental Explanation of Intentionality" (2025), Australasian Philosophical Review
"How to be Pluralistic about Neural Correlates of Consciousness" (2025), WIAS Bulletin
"What Makes a Theory of Consciousness Unscientific?" (second corresponding author, with IIT-concerned et al., 2025), Nature Neuroscience
Response 1; Response 2
IIT Controversy FAQ; The Original Letter
"Capturing the Elusive Self: Review of Know Thyself: The New Science of Self-Awareness" (2025), Philosophical Psychology 38
"Artificial Intelligence in Lie Detection: Why Do Cognitive Theories Matter?" (with Philip Tseng, 2025), New Ideas in Psychology 76
"The Sustenance and Retention of Perspectival Shape Representations" (with Philip Tseng et al., 2024), Consciousness and Cognition 126
"Structural Correspondence in Molyneux's Subjects" (2024), Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5
Consciousness and Its Epistemic Roles (special issue, first editor, with Takuya Niikawa, 2024), Synthese
"Book Symposium for John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity" (2024), Asian Journal of Philosophy
"Book Review: Philosophy of Neuroscience" (2024), Erkenntnis
"Neural Representations of Perspectival Shapes and Attentional Effects: Evidence from fMRI and MEG" (with Yi Lin et al., 2024), Cortex 176
"Causal Prominence for Neuroscience" (with Philip Tseng, 2024), Nature Reviews Neuroscience 25
"Schellenberg and the Capacity to Perceive" (2024). In: Vuletić, M. and Beck, O. (eds.) Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience. Springer
Transcendental Epistemology (2024), Cambridge University Press.
"Perspectival Shapes are Viewpoint-Dependent Relational Properties" (first author, with Yi Lin and Cheng-Wei Wu, 2024), Psychological Review 131(1)
"The Language of Tactile Thoughts" (2023), Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46
"Predictive Processing in the Second Brain: From Gut Complex to Meta-Awareness" (first author, with Su-Ling Yeh et al., 2023). In: Cheng, T., Sato, R., and Hohwy, J. (eds.) Expected Experiences: The Predictive Mind and in Uncertain World. Routledge
Expected Experiences: The Predictive Mind in an Uncertain World (first editor, with R. Sato and J. Hohwy, 2023), Routledge
"Transcendental Arguments" (with Robert Stern, 2023). In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
"Artificial Agential Intelligence" (2022), Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 9(3)
"Illusions, Objectivity, and Non-Reductive Emergentism: Reply to Rose" (2022), Perception 51(12)
"Taking Conceptual Issues Really Seriously: One Next Step for the Cognitive Science of Consciousness" (first author, with Yi Lin and Philip Tseng, 2022), Cognitive Science: A Multidisciplinary Journal 46
"Demystifying Consciousness and Non-cognitive Theories of Consciousness" (2022), Journal of Neurophilosophy 1(2)
"Bodily Awareness" (2022). In The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
"Book Review: In Consciousness We Trust" (with Yi Lin, 2022), Perception 51(8)
"Book Review: Metazoa - Animal Life and the Birth of the Mind" (2022), Biosystems 219
"Spatial Representations in Sensory Modalities" (2022), Mind and Language 37(3)
"P3b does not Reflect Perceived Contrasts" (with Brown Hsieh et al., 2022), eNeuro 9(2)
"Post-Perceptual Confidence and Supervaluative Matching Profile" (2022), Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65(3)
"Radical Internalism Meets Radical Externalism, Or: Smithies' Epistemology Transcendentalised" (2022), Asian Journal of Philosophy 1(1)
"Touch and other Somatosensory Senses" (first author, with Antonio Cataldo, 2022). In: De Brigard, F. and Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (eds.) Neuroscience and Philosophy. MIT Press
"Book Review: The Epistemic Role of Consciousness" (2022), Philosophical Quarterly 72(1)
"Perception" (2022). In: Young, B. and Dicey Jennings, C. (eds.) Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience. Routledge
John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity: Oxford Kantianism Meets Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences (2021), Bloomsbury Academic
[Scholarly Monograph Award in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Academia Sinica, 2022]
Self and World, 20 Years On (special issue, editor, 2021), Analytic Philosophy 62(1)
"Molyneux's Question and Somatosensory Spaces" (2020). In: Ferretti, G. and Glenney, B. (eds.) Molyneux's Question and the History of Philosophy. Routledge
Objectivity, Space, and Mind (special issue, first editor, with P. F. Snowdon, 2019), Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences 18(5)
Spatial Senses: Philosophy of Perception in an Age of Science (first editor, with O. Deroy and C. Spence, 2019), Routledge
"Quine’s Naturalism and Behaviorisms" (2018), Metaphilosophy 49(4)
"A Mechanism for Spatial Perception on Human Skin" (with F. Fardo, B. Beck, and P. Haggard, 2018), Cognition 178
"The Recurrent Model of Bodily Spatial Phenomenology" (first author, with P. Haggard, 2018), Journal of Consciousness Studies 25(3-4)
"Spatial Perception and the Sense of Touch" (with P. Haggard, B. Beck, and F. Fardo, 2017). In: de Vignemont, F. and Alsmith, A. (eds.) The Subject's Matter: Self-Consciousness and the Body. MIT Press
"The Sceptical Paradox and the Nature of the Self" (2016), Philosophical Investigations 39(1)
"The Trajectory of Self" (with T. Lane, N. Duncan, and G. Northoff, 2016), Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20(7)
"Book Review: Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness" (2016), Philosophical Psychology 29(4)
"Why Animals are Persons" (2016), Animal Sentience 1(10)
“Obstacles to Testing Molyneux’s Question Empirically" (2015), i-Perception 6(4)
"Book Review: The First Sense" (2015), Frontiers in Psychology 6
Online Talks
Causation in Neuroscience (2025, Jan. 11th)
理論心理學（下） (2023, Jan. 15th)
理論心理學（上） (2022, Dec. 4th)
康德與現象學 (課堂2022, Sep. 29th)
化學感官 (2022, June 29th)
莫利紐茲問題：思想實驗與科學實驗 (2022, June 1st)
觸覺與身體感 (2022, June 1st)
時間與時間意識 (2022, April 16th)
McDowellian Naturalism and Strong Emergence (2022, March 9th)
意識的真象與假象 (2021, Dec. 1st)
Transcendental Arguments, Conceivability, and De Re Necessity (2021, Nov. 8th)
(Un)consciousness and (In)attention (2021, Oct. 28th)
On The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2021, May 1st)
Blogposts etc.
布倫塔諾的哲學心理學 (2024)
Philosophy of Touch in the Laboratory (2022)
申請英國哲學研究所分享 (2022)
麥克道爾 (2022)
Précis of John McDowell on Worldly Subjectivity (2021)
知覺哲學：傳統與跨域 (2021)
麥克道爾論世界中的主體性 (2021)
哲學與認知科學：我的個人體驗 (2021)
注意力與意識 (2020)
安斯康姆式的行動以及自我知識理論 (2020)
哲學要訣？ [多位作者] (2020)
當代英美哲學的差異 (2019)
意識哲學的五本好書 (2019)
其他作者的作品
